icy in the region, but recent events suggest that the wind is shifting in New Delhi and Indian policy makers are going to be thrown off by this new geopolitical reality-shift, especially as China continues on its new rise to global prominence.
The Origins of Diego Garcia’s Military Significance
In 1966, the UK and US signed a treaty in order to build military facilities in the British Indian Ocean Territories. This incorporated the building of a communication center on Diego Garcia, which soon became a key US military hub. The facility’s expansion possibilities, which included airstrip construction and the berthing of nuclear submarines, made New Delhi uneasy as it considered such activities as endangering its security concerns. The very notion of foreign military constructs so close to the Indian territory was not in agreement with New Delhi’s image of the “conduct zone”. Indian leaders have always been insisting that the regions would be destabilized and infringed upon because of those bases. Such apprehensions were made worse by past events during the Cold War, which had shown that the rivalries of superpowers mingled with their businesses in that part of the world, which also included the Indian subcontinent.
India’s Opposition to Diego Garcia
India expressed its apprehension towards the American involvement within Diego Garcia through different means and messaging. The Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) stated in a memorandum dated 1974 that, any hostile military installation close to Lakshadweep and Minicoy would have serious security concerns for India. This concern had stemmed earlier from a deeper fear regarding the race to militarize the Indian Ocean and an arms race, something which regional allies such as Australia shared with India, comprising Prime Minister Gough Whitlam, who called for the superpowers in the region to exercise restraint.
In addition, India’s discontent was not about only Diego Garcia. The broader framework was also Britain’s previous dismissal of the Maldives’ ‘Gan’ facility as a possible site for military purposes which further compounded India’s worries. New Delhi believed that the actions of the US and the UK were attempts to intrude in its sphere of influence and thus developed a marked hostility to foreign military bases in Indian Ocean region.
Shifting Geopolitical Landscape
Rise of China
The final decades of the Cold War have seen a dramatic reconfiguration of the Indian Ocean’s geopolitical landscape. None, however, has changed the strategic calculus surrounding this region quite like China’s naval ascendancy. Such increased presence, visible in naval deployments and the opening up of ports under the Belt and Road Initiative, has set alarm bells ringing in New Delhi. There is a keen need to balance China’s influence, thus the Indian requirement of a robust US military presence in the Indian Ocean has made its policy to review India’s historical stance on Diego Garcia and US military operations.
The New Indo-US Partnership
Obviously, New Delhi’s new relationship with Washington has also played a big role in this reappraisal. The strategic partnership in the 21st century has been marked by a shared worldview of democracy and concerns about terrorism and regional stability; thus, it has furthered a convergence of interests between these two nations. The US base at Diego Garcia became more and more seen less as a nuisance and more and more as an asset which guaranteed the indispensable balance of power in the Indian Ocean.
The latest accord between the UK and Mauritius on devolution of sovereignty over the Chagos Archipelago to Mauritius added a new twist to this issue. India has offered only rhetoric support to the sovereignty claim of Mauritius, but the US military presence in Diego Garcia is likely to be seen by New Delhi as a practical exigency within the context of checking China’s maritime ambitions.
The Indian Perspective on Sovereignty and Security
Support for Mauritius
India’s enduring position of support for Mauritius regarding the latter’s claim over the Chagos Archipelago is in line with the principles of its strict adherence to national sovereignty and self-determination. More broadly, this reflects India’s foreign policy objectives, with respect to the opposite pole, the values of international law and the rights of nations. By supporting Mauritius in its claims over the Chagos Archipelago, India strengthens its diplomatic relations with the island nation but also comes out as a pan-regional representative of solidarity against colonial legacies.
Security Implications
But India’s help to Mauritius does not reduce its pragmatic understanding of the strategic significance of Diego Garcia. The base offers the US essential capabilities required for undertaking maritime security in the Indian Ocean particularly in light of rising Chinese naval might. Surveillance and logistical support and rapid response operations, vital for securing freedom of navigation and for protecting significant trade routes, are possible at the base.
Now, the strategic calculus of India will balance its support toward Mauritius with reality because it has a chance of cooperation with the US, inclusive of access to military resources and sharing of intelligence, which in fact will be part of the strategy for India to ensure that the national interests of India are preserved.
A New Era of Strategic Cooperation
Bilateral Military Engagements
In the last few decades, the military relations between India and the US have also increased considerably due to a number of pacts aimed at enhancing interoperability and joint operational capabilities between the armed forces. The Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA) and the Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA) are two of the important agreements that provide for enhanced partnership of the two militaries. These agreements provide Indian forces access to US military bases for logistical military support, which of course includes access to the facilities at Diego Garcia.
Regional Security Framework
India’s new position on Diego Garcia can be viewed as part of a well-structured regional security architecture. The Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) and the interaction with the ASEAN countries possible demonstrate India’s wish to promote maritime security in a rather more institutional way. Moreover, by adopting today’s multilateral policy, India aims to solve such problems as piracy, illegal fishing and humanitarian catastrophes which are usually commonplace in the region and also bears the risks of encroachments on other powers. Recent Quad meetings of the US, Japan, Australia and India are also oriented to this cause. The task of the Quad is to work towards a free and open Indo-pacific Region, while more specific goals relate to ensuring peace and security in the Indian Ocean region. Thus, India’s development of cooperation with Diego Garcia is likely to relate to larger undertakings seeking to mitigate the impact of common dangers in the region.
Conclusion
Gone are the days when India had a resolute opposition to any permanent US foothold at Diego Garcia. The location has come to be accepted as a necessary tool of policy, given the changes in relations among states. With the increasing activities of China in the Indian Ocean, India also understands the importance of collaborating closely with the US, while assenting to Mauritius’ claim over the Chagos Archipelago.
This changing posture has also been replicated violence oscillating trend – regional cooperation is on the rise to meet common security problems. In doing this balancing act, India seeks to be in the forefront on matters concerning the Indian Ocean politics of the twenty first century, underlining its ability to compete for influence. It seems obvious that India will build on its past relations, as well as recent ones, to secure the Indian Ocean ‘as a zone of peace’, in due course, and in this way, forward its national interests and regional aspirations.
